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“SO FAR AS WAR ALLOWS”:
WHY THE AL MAHDI CONVICTION IS UNLIKELY TO
STEM THE PACE OF CULTURAL DESTRUCTION
PERPETRATED BY NON-STATE ACTORS
Jessica E. Burrus†
Abstract: In September of 2016, Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi was convicted in the
International Criminal Court (“ICC”) for the intentional destruction of several World
Heritage sites during the 2012 conflict in Timbuktu, Mali. This conviction was hailed as a
breakthrough after years of frustration with the lack of enforcement of international laws
prohibiting the destruction of cultural property. It was also the first conviction of its kind,
and advocates of cultural preservation have celebrated it as a much-needed general
deterrent in North Africa and the Middle East, where iconoclasm has become a favorite
tactic of various state and non-state actors in armed conflict. However, the Al Mahdi trial
may in fact be the exception that proves the untenability of the legal regime protecting
cultural heritage sites. Current treaty law protecting immovable cultural property reflects
an increasingly outdated philosophical and historical narrative that is directly contradicted
by the ideologies of the groups that most often threaten World Heritage sites. As long as
the protection of cultural property remains more closely associated with a state’s sovereign
responsibility to protect physical buildings, as opposed to the international community’s
willingness to protect the people who hold those buildings dear, the effective prevention of
the destruction of cultural heritage will remain out of reach.
Cite as: Jessica E. Burrus, “So Far as War Allows”: Why the Al Mahdi Conviction is
Unlikely to Stem the Pace of Cultural Destruction Perpetrated by Non-State Actors, 27
WASH. INT’L L.J. 317 (2017).

I.

INTRODUCTION
Today we are fighting in a country which has contributed a great
deal to our cultural inheritance, a country rich in monuments
which by their creation helped and now in their old age illustrate
the growth of the civilization which is ours. We are bound to
respect those monuments so far as war allows.1

General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s instructions to the Allied troops
fighting in Italy during World War II demonstrate the nascent foundational
presumptions of his generation that influenced twentieth-century international
lawmaking on the preservation of cultural property. In the excerpt above,
†
J.D. candidate, University of Washington School of Law, class of 2018. The author would like to
thank Professor Adam Eisenberg and Professor M.J. Durkee for their support and advice throughout the
comment-writing process.
1
Letter from Dwight D. Eisenhower, Commander-in-Chief, Allied Force Headquarters, to All
Commanders (Dec. 29, 1943) (emphasis added), https://text-message.blogs.archives.gov/2014/02/10/
general-dwight-d-eisenhower-and-the-protection-of-cultural-property/.
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which is the opening paragraph of his letter, Eisenhower firmly established
that the military in wartime had a duty of stewardship—if not co-ownership—
of the cultural property surrounding them in Italy. His statements rely on a
notion of collective responsibility: Italy’s monuments are emblematic of “our”
civilization, and “we” are their cultural heirs. That said, the same letter takes
an equally firm stance on the necessity to protect bodies before buildings,
stating that however valuable that cultural property may be, “our men’s lives
count infinitely more.”2
The nature, extent, and even the existence of this “sacred duty”3 to
protect cultural property face unique challenges in the twenty-first century. A
pattern of iconoclasm4 has accompanied the rise of militant religious stateand non-state actors in Africa and the Middle East, often committed in
defiance of the international community. 5 The current legal regime protecting
cultural property remains particularly ill-suited for conflicts with and among
non-state actors6 who define themselves in religious, racial, and ideological
terms. This same structure has hindered the recognition of the rights of
indigenous peoples and minority groups, and many monuments and sites

2

Id.
Constitution of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation pmbl., Nov.
16, 1945, 4 U.N.T.S. 275 [hereinafter UNESCO Constitution], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/
UNTS/Volume%204/volume-4-I-52-English.pdf (“[T]he wide diffusion of culture, . . . education . . . and
peace are indispensable . . . and constitute a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfill . . . .”).
4
“Iconoclasm” will be used in this Comment to identify “the rejection or destruction of religious
images as heretical.” Iconoclasm, NEW OXFORD AMERICAN DICTIONARY (3d ed. 2015).
5
See, e.g., Kevin D. Kornegay, Destroying the Shrines of Unbelievers: The Challenge of Iconoclasm
to the International Framework for the Protection of Cultural Property, 221 MIL. L. REV. 153, 154 (2014)
(“[T]he destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas was also a statement of defiance of the international community,
which had lobbied strenuously for their preservation”); Francesco Francioni & Federico Lenzerini, The
Destruction of the Buddhas of Bamiyan and International Law, 14 EUR. J. INT’L L. 619, 620 (2003) (“[T]o
the knowledge of the authors, this episode [the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas] is the first planned and
deliberate destruction of cultural heritage of great importance as act of defiance of the United Nations and of
the international community.”).
6
This Comment will rely on Andrew Clapham’s expansive definition of “non-state actor” as
“including any entity that is not actually a state, often used to refer to armed groups, terrorists, civil society,
religious groups, or corporations,” recognizing that the international community itself and the United
Nations, as an intergovernmental organization, may also be described as “non-state actors.” Andrew
Clapham, Non-State Actors, in POSTCONFLICT PEACE-BUILDING: A LEXICON 200–02 (Vincent Chetail ed.,
2009), https://ssrn.com/abstract=1339810.
3
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designated for international protection face an unprecedented threat of
destruction as groups vie for cultural dominance.7
The International Criminal Court’s (“ICC”) ability to prosecute cultural
destruction as a war crime is considered an important deterrent against
iconoclastic tactics,8 but until recently it had never been wielded. 9 That all
changed on September 27, 2016, when the ICC sentenced Ahmad Al Faqi Al
Mahdi to nine years of imprisonment for his role in the destruction of nine
mausoleums10 and the door of a mosque in Timbuktu, Mali, in 2012, 11 all of
which were United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
(“UNESCO”) World Heritage sites.12 Al Mahdi was a member of Ansar Dine,

See May Yaacoub & Karim Hendili, Cultural Sites in the Middle East Face “Unprecedented”
Destruction,
UNITED
NATIONS
RADIO
(Dec.
15,
2016),
http://www.unmultimedia.org/radio/english/2016/12/cultural-sites-in-the-middle-east-face-unprecedenteddestruction/. It should be noted that recent progress has been made in the form of, for example, new
protections for intangible cultural property. See, e.g., Francesco Francioni, The Human Dimension of
International Cultural Heritage Law: An Introduction, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 9, 14 (2011) (“States remain the
contracting parties to the [Convention for the Safeguarding of Intangible Cultural Heritage] but the
substantive addressees are the cultural communities and human groups, including minorities, whose cultural
traditions are the real object of the safeguarding under international law.”).
8
Jason Burke, ICC Ruling for Timbuktu Destruction ‘Should Be Deterrent for Others’, GUARDIAN,
Sept. 27, 2016, 6:25 AM, https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/sep/27/timbuktu-shrines-icc-sentencesislamic-militant-nine-years-destruction-ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi.
9
Patty Gerstenblith, The Destruction of Cultural Heritage: A Crime Against Property or a Crime
Against People?, 15 J. MARSHALL REV. INTELL. PROP. L. 336, 387 (2016).
10
These were: “1) the mausoleum Sidi Mahamoud Ben Omar Mohamed Aquit, 2) the mausoleum
Sheikh Mohamed Mahmoud Al Arawani, 3) the mausoleum Sheikh Sidi Mokhtar Ben Sidi Muhammad Ben
Sheikh Alkabir, 4) the mausoleum Alpha Moya, 5) the mausoleum Sheikh Sidi Ahmed Ben Amar Arragadi,
6) the mausoleum Sheikh Muhammad El Mikki, 7) the mausoleum Sheikh Abdoul Kassim Attouaty, 8) the
mausoleum Ahmed Fulane, and 9) the mausoleum Bahaber Babadié . . . .” Case Information Sheet, Int’l
Criminal Court [ICC], Situation in the Republic of Mali: The Prosecutor v. Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi (Aug.
24, 2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/iccdocs/PIDS/publications/AlMahdiEng.pdf.
11
Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 38(viii) (Sept. 27,
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.pdf.
12
“World Heritage” is the UNESCO “designation for places on Earth that are of outstanding universal
value to humanity and as such, have been inscribed on the World Heritage List to be protected . . . .” FAQ:
What Is World Heritage?, UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/faq/19 (last updated Feb. 10, 2017). Countries
that have signed the World Heritage Convention may inscribe sites on the list. See The Criteria for Selection,
UNESCO, http://whc.unesco.org/en/criteria/ (last visited Nov. 4, 2017). Sites must meet certain criteria for
selection to qualify for inclusion. Id. Though not a prerequisite for prosecution upon destruction, the high
profile of UNESCO World Heritage sites can help to draw attention to the fact that a deliberate cultural attack
has been made. For example, judges of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia
(“ICTY”) have explicitly referred to the status of cultural sites as UNESCO World Heritage sites in
emphasizing the gravity of criminal acts of destruction. See Micaela Frulli, The Criminalization of Offences
Against Cultural Heritage in Times of Armed Conflict: The Quest for Consistency, 22 EUR. J. INT’L L. 203,
209 (2011).
7
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an Islamist group that took the city and sought to begin enforcing its members’
interpretation of Islamic law by destroying sites they considered idolatrous. 13
In the words of UNESCO in the wake of the Al Mahdi conviction,
cultural destruction is used “to destroy people as well as the monuments
bearing their identities, institutions of knowledge and free thought.”14
However, as noted in the decision, Al Mahdi was “not charged with crimes
against persons but with a crime against property.”15 Furthermore, “even if
inherently grave, crimes against property are generally of lesser gravity than
crimes against persons.”16 Even during the flurry of international cooperation
on this subject following World War II, “cultural property . . . was not
protected under the Geneva Conventions, likely because cultural heritage
destruction was not considered to be as serious as other war crimes.”17 It
should also be noted that in Timbuktu, Al Mahdi’s destruction of religious
monuments pales in comparison to the human rights abuses observers
documented during the 2012 conflict in Mali. 18 These abuses include
extrajudicial executions, sexual violence, torture, floggings, and
amputations.19
The trial and conviction of Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi for the crime of
cultural destruction is remarkable because it was the first of its kind in several
ways.20 He was the first ICC defendant to enter a plea of guilty, the first
13

See Mali Crisis: Key Players, BBC NEWS, Mar. 12, 2013, http://www.bbc.com/news/world-africa17582909/.
14
Camila Domonoske, For First Time, Destruction of Cultural Sites Leads to War Crime Conviction,
NAT’L PUB. R ADIO, Sept. 27, 2016, 9:33 AM, http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2016/
09/27/495606932/for-first-time-destruction-of-cultural-sites-leads-to-war-crime-conviction/.
15
Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence ¶ 77. There is, however, evidence that Al Mahdi was at least
complicit in other crimes against the citizens of Timbuktu. See Marlise Simons, Extremist Pleads Guilty in
Hague Court to Destroying Cultural Sites in Timbuktu, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 22, 2016,
https://www.nytimes.com/2016/08/23/world/europe/ahmed-al-mahdi-hague-trial.html; see also discussion
infra Sections III.B, III.C. For more on human rights groups accusing Al Mahdi of war crimes against
persons, see Malian Jihadist Pleads Guilty to Timbuktu Shrine Destruction in Historic Trial, FRANCE 24,
Aug. 22, 2016, http://www.france24.com/en/20160822-mali-icc-justice-timbuktu-jihadist-cultural-heritagedestruction/.
16
Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence ¶ 77. Some have speculated that a similar philosophy is evident
in the Statute of the ICTY: “[G]iven the massive scale of crimes being perpetrated against people and the
ensuing irreparable loss of human life, the protection of a certain kind of property per se was not considered
a priority.” Frulli, supra note 12, at 208.
17
Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 344.
18
See HUMAN RIGHTS W ATCH, COLLAPSE, CONFLICT AND ATROCITY IN MALI: HUMAN RIGHTS
WATCH REPORTING ON THE 2012–13 A RMED CONFLICT AND ITS AFTERMATH 4 (2014),
https://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/related_material/mali0514_ForUpload.pdf.
19
Id.
20
See Al Mahdi, Judgment and Sentence ¶ 13.
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defendant to be convicted of cultural destruction as a war crime before the
ICC, and the first jihadist ICC defendant.21 As such, the international
community, and particularly those organizations charged with safeguarding
the cultural property that groups like Ansar Dine have targeted in recent years,
were quick to applaud his being brought to justice in an international tribunal.
Despite the vocal international condemnation of cultural destruction during
armed conflict, civil unrest, and revolution in the Middle East and North
Africa,22 until September 2016, the ICC had never before been presented with
an opportunity to prosecute a war criminal accused of the destruction of
cultural property.23 Indeed, prior to this prosecution, the notion seemed
fanciful at best due to the international courts’ lack of jurisdiction in the
countries most at risk, including Iraq and Syria. 24 As one journalist summed
up the situation, “[B]eyond scolding the Islamists of the Sahel, there’s little
anyone can do to stop this wretched bout of iconoclasm. History is littered
with the debris of toppled temples and smashed idols.”25 Another scholar
remarked in 2007, “[I]t is difficult to imagine that states or international
organizations like the International Criminal Court would devote significant
resources to prosecuting looters and traders if violations of treaties were
treated as international crimes, as many scholars advocate.”26 There is hope
that the conviction “could help persuade other nations to pursue similar
charges relating to Syria and Iraq, where no international court has yet
jurisdiction,”27 and where international efforts to preserve World Heritage
sites have fallen on deaf ears.28 This hope may be rooted in the notion that
highly visible convictions like Al Mahdi’s help establish the prohibition of
21
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi, the Scholar and Enforcer of Timbuktu, NATIONAL (Aug. 19, 2016, 4:00
AM) [hereinafter Scholar and Enforcer], https://www.thenational.ae/world/ahmad-al-faqi-al-mahdi-thescholar-and-enforcer-of-timbuktu-1.138823.
22
“The failure of international law to protect the remains of the past has been glaringly and painfully
obvious, as foreign governments, international organizations including UNESCO and the United Nations,
and a multitude of private nongovernmental cultural organizations have issued countless statements
condemning the destruction.” Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 337.
23
Domonoske, supra note 14.
24
Simons, supra note 15.
25
Ishaan Tharoor, Timbuktu’s Destruction: Why Islamists Are Wrecking Mali’s Cultural Heritage,
TIME, July 2, 2012, http://world.time.com/2012/07/02/timbuktus-destruction-why-islamists-are-wreckingmalis-cultural-heritage/. To clarify, “the Sahel” is derived from an Arabic word meaning “shore,” and it refers
to the region of North Africa south of the Sahara from the Atlantic Ocean to the Red Sea. Noah Butler, Sahel,
OXFORD
REFERENCE,
http://www.oxfordreference.com/view/10.1093/acref/9780195176322
.001.0001/acref-9780195176322-e-1380 (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
26
Eric A. Posner, The International Protection of Cultural Property: Some Skeptical Observations, 8
CHI. J. INT’L L. 213, 219–20 (2007).
27
Simons, supra note 15.
28
For example, United Nations and Arab League officials in 2014 pleaded for a halt to the cultural
destruction in Syria. See ‘Stop the Destruction’, UN Officials Urge in Plea to Save Syria’s Cultural Heritage,
UN NEWS CENTRE, Mar. 12, 2014, http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=47340.
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cultural destruction as customary international law that may be enforced
against non-state actors.29
Although international law prohibiting cultural destruction has finally
yielded a tangible result, that result stands alone atop a growing pile of ancient
rubble, and “in the realm of cultural heritage, the paucity of such prosecutions
mean that it is very much open to question whether these legal provisions
provide any actual deterrence to the commission of these violations.”30 For
this reason, it is important to assess the specific conditions of the Mali
situation, as well as whether they bode well for the future of cultural
preservation. Despite the well-earned and earnest words from UNESCO
representatives upon the conviction of Al Mahdi, their predictions about the
trial’s potential deterrent effect on the way state and non-state actors wage war
are unlikely to come true.
When it comes to the protection of humanity’s irreplaceable cultural
property, rhetorical commitment to the cause often far exceeds the legal
protections that the international community can agree to adopt. 31 This
regulatory reticence may be rooted in a basic rejection of the concept of
international ownership of cultural heritage because of the challenge it
presents to national ownership and sovereign decision-making.
In many ways, international laws protecting the world’s cultural
heritage can be seen as “imposing obligations on nations to care for the
cultural property located within their borders and to safeguard both their own
and their adversaries’ cultural property during warfare.”32 Depending on
cultural context, the nature of a given conflict, and available resources, that
imposition may be culturally unwelcome or practically impossible to achieve.
Without making it clear that the destruction of heritage sites comprises war
crimes, the international community risks exacerbating the impulse to destroy
these sites because it appears to reward victors and punish the defeated on the
basis of ideological allegiances.
In Part I, this Comment examined whether the Al Mahdi decision
represents a new chapter in the international treaty regime that recognizes and
29
Francesco Francioni points to this hope in his discussion of the prosecution for the intentional
destruction of the Stela of Matara by the Eritrea-Ethiopia Claims Commission. Francioni, supra note 7, at
13.
30
Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 352.
31
See, e.g., Frulli, supra note 12, at 205–06.
32
Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 348.
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discourages cultural destruction, or if future generations will look back on it
as an ultimately ineffective stab at preventing property-based war crimes. Part
II explores critical elements of the modern international legal regime
protecting cultural property, with a particular focus on the underlying policies
of ownership and stewardship. It also discusses the roots of that regime,
which includes the 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property
in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution of the
Convention (“1954 Hague Convention”), the 1972 UNESCO Convention for
the Protection of the World Cultural and National Heritage (“World Heritage
Convention”), and the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court
(“Rome Statute”). Part III traces the 2012 conflict in Mali and analyzes the
Al Mahdi trial and conviction with a brief explanation of the 2012–2013
conflict in Mali and the ascendance of Ansar Dine in Timbuktu. It also
includes a description of the nature of the cultural property that was destroyed
in Mali, and an account of the destruction of the cultural heritage sites of
Timbuktu.
The Al Mahdi conviction represents a rare moment when a destroyer of
cultural heritage was brought to justice. However, as the following analysis
reveals, it is unlikely to have an impact on the future of the preservation of
cultural heritage beyond Mali because the current threat to cultural property
posed by non-state actors defies the foundational presumptions of our current
treaty regime.
II.

HIGHLIGHTS OF THE INTERNATIONAL TREATY REGIME PROTECTING
IMMOVABLE CULTURAL PROPERTY DURING ARMED CONFLICT

The recent enforcement of international law protecting cultural heritage
in Mali was possible because of the country’s membership in key organs of
international law as well as its ratification of several important conventions
on the subject. International and national laws restricting the destruction of
cultural property during conflict have deep roots and are closely related to
general rules governing armed conflict. However, for the purposes of
analyzing the Al Mahdi conviction, this section will focus on post-World War
II international conventions to which Mali is a party.
Before delving into the contours of international law which led to Al
Mahdi’s conviction, it is important to question why the law protects cultural
property in the first place. In international criminal law, the crime of cultural
destruction is not characterized as a form of genocide, although one could

324

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 27 NO. 1

characterize the motivations of those who perpetrate cultural destruction as
genocidal.33 Despite the passionate reasoning of Rafael Lemkin, an architect
of the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, a provision including cultural destruction as a form of genocide
was not included in the final form of that convention. 34 As prominent legal
scholar Patty Gerstenblith has noted, this exclusion partially accounts for the
ineffective enforcement of the laws against cultural destruction. Arguably,
the international emphasis on the protection of physical monuments, as
opposed to intangible cultural heritage or practices, can be traced back to this
exclusion.35 Notably, the International Criminal Tribunal for the Former
Yugoslavia (“ICTY”) has analyzed the connection between war crimes of
persecution by way of cultural destruction and genocide, 36 “finding . . . that
deliberate destruction of cultural heritage . . . may constitute evidence of the
element of mens rea required for the commission of the crime of genocide.”37
That said, cultural destruction is most often characterized as a war
crime and can be prosecuted under domestic law as violative of several
international conventions. Most importantly for the purposes of the situation
in Mali, in the absence of adequate domestic law, cultural destruction can also
be prosecuted under the Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, the
violation of which led to the arrest of Al Mahdi.
A.

Early Roots of Cultural Property Protection

General Eisenhower was not the first American to remind soldiers of
their obligation to prevent the avoidable destruction of immoveable cultural
property. In 1863, United States President Abraham Lincoln commissioned
the Lieber Code, designed by Francis Lieber to be a “work for mankind of
historic effect and permanency.”38 It specified that “churches, . . .
establishments of education, or foundations for the promotion of knowledge,
33

Id. at 342–44.
Id. at 343.
35
Id. at 343–44.
36
“While the parallel between persecution and genocide has the advantage of attaching symbolic value
to the protection of cultural property, it also brings the problem of the high threshold for the presentation of
evidence . . . .” Hirad Abtahi, The Protection of Cultural Property in Armed Conflict: The Practice of the
International Criminal Tribunal for the Former Yugoslavia, 14 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 1, 28 (2001); see also
Frulli, supra note 12, at 207–08 (discussing the differences between proposed and final definitions of cultural
property in Article 3(d) of the Statute of the ICTY).
37
Francesco Francioni, Beyond State Sovereignty: The Protection of Cultural Heritage as a Shared
Interest of Humanity, 25 MICH. J. INT’L L. 1209, 1218 (2004).
38
Jordan J. Paust, Dr. Francis Lieber and the Lieber Code, 95 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 112, 112
(2001).
34
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. . . [and] museums of the fine arts, or of a scientific character . . . [were] not
to be considered public property” that could be seized by a victorious army, 39
and that “art, libraries, scientific collection, or precious instruments . . . must
be secured against all avoidable injury, even when they are contained in
fortified places whilst besieged or bombarded.”40 It is widely acknowledged 41
as “the first codification of the obligation to safeguard cultural sites and
objects during war”42—an obligation that arguably dates back to the Romans
whose temples are now the subjects of that protection. 43 The Union and the
Confederacy, locked in combat, also struggled to define the nature of their
conflict—whether it was fundamentally civil or international—and
consequently, the rules of engagement applicable to the war.44 The Lieber
Code provided much-needed guidelines while tabling, for the moment, this
fundamental question, and its precursor was distributed amongst Union
soldiers as a pamphlet to ensure they received the message. 45 Even so, the
Lieber Code made generous allowances for derogation in deference to
military strategy, and General Sherman’s “March to the Sea” arguably
violated many of the civilian protections contained therein.46
The history of cultural property protection in armed conflict can seem
like a litany of commitments and betrayals, even by states with a reputation
for the conscientious observance of the rules of war. Building on the Lieber
Code and the Brussels Declaration of 1874,47 formal international legal
protection of immoveable cultural property48 during war was, for the most
39
The Lieber Code of 1863, Instructions for the Government of Armies of the United States in the
Field, Series III, Vol. 3, sec. 124, General Orders No. 100, art. 34 (Apr. 24, 1863),
http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/lieber.asp.
40
Id. art. 35. The Lieber Code notably touches on both wartime plunder and cultural destruction. This
Comment notes the important distinction between the two and will focus only on the latter.
41
Kornegay, supra note 5, at 161 (“[I]t is not an exaggeration to say that the Lieber Code’s provisions
for protection of cultural property were the progenitors of the entire framework of protections for cultural
property that now exist under international law.”).
42
Patty Gerstenblith, From Bamiyan to Baghdad: Warfare and the Preservation of Cultural Heritage
at the Beginning of the 21st Century, 37 GEO. J. INT’L L. 245, 254 (2006).
43
“[I]n his prosecution, in 70 B.C., of Gaius Verres . . . . Cicero distinguished between ordinary war
booty (spolia), which a conqueror was free to take, and illegal removal of art and architectural decoration
(spoliatio).” Id. at 250.
44
See Patryk I. Labuda, Lieber Code, OXFORD PUB. INT’L L., http://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/
law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e2126 (last updated Sept. 2014).
45
Paust, supra note 38, at 113.
46
Labuda, supra note 44.
47
See, e.g., Laws and Treaties Protecting Cultural Property: The Lieber Code of 1863, U.S.
COMMITTEE BLUE SHIELD, http://uscbs.org/1863-lieber-code.html (last visited Nov. 4, 2017).
48
Though the exact parameters of what cultural property is are drawn differently in different
conventions, see discussion infra Sections II.B–D, this Comment will use the term “immovable cultural
property” as it is used by UNESCO, meaning “tangible cultural heritage” such as “monuments,
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part, a child of the twentieth century—only a little younger than Eisenhower
himself—maturing particularly rapidly after World War II49 in an
international community still reeling from the widespread destruction50 that
Eisenhower sought to palliate. After all, during World War II the Allied
troops in Italy destroyed an ancient Benedictine Abbey on a hilltop called
Monte Cassino on February 15, 1944, just forty-eight days after Eisenhower
penned his letter discouraging cultural destruction.51 The bombing of the
abbey resulted in the complete annihilation of the building and the deaths of
countless civilians sheltering inside, but it was ultimately deemed a military
failure because the Allied forces had to fight on for three more months before
the hill was captured.52 Disasters like Monte Cassino paved the way for a
reevaluation of wartime cultural heritage protection even before the war
ended.53
B.

The 1954 Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in
the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations for the Execution
of the Convention, Also Known as the 1954 Hague Convention

The 1954 Hague Convention was “the first international convention to
address exclusively the subject of cultural property,”54 and some have argued
that the specificity with which cultural destruction has been addressed by
international law—what with its own particular conventions and all—
provides an important insight into the weakness with which these laws have
been enforced.55 Mali ratified the 1954 Hague Convention on May 18, 1961.56
archaeological sites, and so on.” What Is Meant by “Cultural Heritage”?, UNESCO,
http://www.unesco.org/new/en/culture/themes/illicit-trafficking-of-cultural-property/unesco-database-ofnational-cultural-heritage-laws/frequently-asked-questions/definition-of-the-cultural-heritage/ (last visited
Nov. 4, 2017).
49
See Prosecutor v. Al Mahdi, Case No. ICC-01/12-01/15, Judgment and Sentence, ¶ 14 (Sept. 27,
2016), https://www.icc-cpi.int/CourtRecords/CR2016_07244.pdf.
50
See Gerstenblith, supra note 42, at 258 (“The largest destruction and displacement of cultural sites
and objects known to human history occurred during World War II.”).
51
Nobuo Hayashi, Contextualizing Military Necessity, 27 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 189, 196–97 (2013).
52
Id. at 197–98.
53
See id. at 198–99.
54
Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 346.
55
Id. at 347. Gerstenblith particularly highlights the ongoing distinction between civilian property and
cultural property in times of war as a peculiarity of international law that “has reduced, rather than enhanced,
the level of protection given to cultural property,” insofar as it serves to further separate crimes against
civilian bodies and civilian practices from crimes against crimes against immovable cultural property, placing
the former much higher than the latter on a sort of conceptual list of priorities in the identification and
prosecution of war crimes. Id.
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A key feature of the 1954 Hague Convention is that it actually defines
cultural property, and it represents the first use of the expression “cultural
property” in this context. Earlier instruments relied on “an empirical
indication of objects of historical, monumental or humanitarian interest,”57 but
the 1954 Hague Convention defines cultural property as, inter alia:
[M]ovable or immovable property of great importance to the
cultural heritage of every people, such as monuments of
architecture, art or history, whether religious or secular;
archaeological sites; groups of buildings which, as a whole, are
of historical or artistic interest; works of art; manuscripts, books
and other objects of artistic, historical or archaeological interest;
as well as scientific collections and important collections of
books . . . .58
The 1954 Hague Convention is notable for its reliance on the term “people”
rather than “nation” or “state” as a basic societal group unit, emphasizing in
its preamble that “damage to cultural property belonging to any people
whatsoever means damage to the cultural heritage of all mankind, since each
people makes its contribution to the culture of the world.”59 This emphasis
carries the promise of protection for minority groups or displaced groups
facing persecution from intrastate conflicts, as opposed to solely international
conflicts. One scholar casts this emphasis on “people” as a “connection to
human rights and [a] foreshadow[ing of] the idea of an integral obligation
owed to the international community as a whole (erga omnes) rather than to
individual states on a contractual basis.”60 From this perspective, the 1954
Hague Convention can be seen as an expression of a set of international
norms, a perspective that often leads to the belief that customary international

57

Francioni, supra note 7, at 10 n.6.
Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict with Regulations
for the Execution of the Convention art. 1, May 14, 1954, 249 U.N.T.S. 240 [hereinafter 1954 Hague
Convention],
https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20249/volume-249-I-3511English.pdf.
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60
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law61 could serve as an avenue for the prosecution of the destruction of
cultural property even when the groups in conflict are not parties to the 1954
Hague Convention.62
This promise of protection for peoples and not merely states is,
however, complicated by phraseology elsewhere in the 1954 Hague
Convention which appears to restrict its obligations on contracting parties to
conflicts similar in nature to World War II—that is, international conflicts
involving ground invasions and foreign occupations. Take, for example, the
duty described in Article 5: “Any High Contracting Party in occupation of the
whole or part of the territory of another High Contracting Party shall as far as
possible support the competent national authorities of the occupied country in
safeguarding and preserving its cultural property.”63 Article 5’s implicit
conceptual basis in a situation involving one foreign power invading and
occupying territory within the borders of another foreign power seems
decidedly inapplicable to the type of occupation Ansar Dine witnessed in
Mali.
The qualification that cultural property be “of great importance to the
cultural heritage of every people” implies that cultural property is that which
is important enough to be held in common. Any nation or group which
accepts and obeys the norms of the 1954 Hague Convention accepts the
presumptions that different cultures are subsets of a common human culture,
that expressions of those cultures carry a basic intrinsic value, and
consequently, should be preserved for as long as possible, regardless of armed
61

Parenthetically, it is important to define and address this perspective on customary international law
as an alternative means of prosecuting the destruction of cultural heritage. For example, prior to its 2009
ratification of the 1954 Hague Convention, the United States “acknowledg[ed] it as customary international
law.” Posner, supra note 26, at 219. Customary international law (“CIL”) is “unwritten law to which nations
may have (at most) only tacitly agreed.” DONALD EARL CHILDRESS III ET AL., TRANSNATIONAL LAW AND
PRACTICE 146 (2015). Black’s Law Dictionary defines “customary law” as “[l]aw consisting of customs that
are accepted as legal requirements or obligatory rules of conduct; practices and beliefs that are so vital and
intrinsic a part of a social and economic system that they are treated as if they were laws.” Customary Law,
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
62
See Francioni, supra note 7, at 13. Despite the optimism of scholars like Francioni, even the use of
sources of law like the 1954 Hague Convention as evidence of CIL—regardless of the complexity of actual
practice—is the subject of ongoing disagreement. Furthermore, as this Comment discusses in this section,
international laws governing the preservation of cultural property in armed conflict are notably inclined to
rely on language reflecting a core belief in moral imperatives and the natural law tradition of early
international law. See CHILDRESS ET AL., supra note 61, at 149 (tracing naturalist as opposed to positivist
rationales for customary international law). Understandably, “the more that ‘naturalistic’ elements are
admitted into the determination of customary international law, the more difficult and less objective the
inquiry may appear.” Id. at 152.
63
1954 Hague Convention, supra note 58, art. 5, ¶ 1.
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conflict. The situational validity of these presumptions is particularly
precarious in times of civil war, cultural revolution, and governmental
collapse.
Under Article 2, “the protection of cultural property shall comprise the
safeguarding of and respect for such property.”64 “Safeguarding,” as defined
in Article 3, relates to peacetime duties to plan for “the foreseeable effects of
an armed conflict”; that is, parties to the convention have an affirmative duty
to prepare for the eventuality of conflict.65 “Respect,” outlined in Article 4,
relates to mutual respect for a party’s own cultural property as well as its
adversaries’ cultural property during armed conflict.66
Article 4, section 2 contains the military necessity exception famously
espoused by Eisenhower during World War II: the obligation of respect “may
be waived only in cases where military necessity imperatively requires such a
waiver.”67 This exception was understandably the subject of considerable
debate, and the Second Protocol to the 1954 Hague Convention (“Second
Protocol”), crafted in the wake of the Balkan Wars, defines the limits of the
military necessity exception for the destruction of cultural sites. 68 It was
“negotiated and adopted in order to reinforce the rather weak system of the
Hague Convention” by limiting the military necessity exception.69 For
example, Article 10 grants “enhanced protection” to cultural property
designated as “cultural heritage of the greatest importance for humanity,”70
while Article 13 provides that “[c]ultural property under enhanced protection
shall only lose such protection . . . if, and for as long as, the property has, by
its use, become a military objective.”71 Critics of the efficacy of the Second
Protocol observe that it has been ratified by far fewer nations than the 1954
Hague Convention, possibly because of its narrower military necessity
exception.72

64

Id. art. 2.
Id. art. 3; see also Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 348.
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Francioni, supra note 37, at 1217.
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Event of Armed Conflict art. 10, ¶ 1(a), Mar. 26, 1999, 2253 U.N.T.S. 212, http://unesdoc.unesco.org/
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However, the 1954 Hague Convention does not itself include
provisions for prosecution or punishment, and so remains textually dependent
on national domestic law for efficacy. 73 Hence, although Mali was a party to
the 1954 Hague Convention as of the 2012 conflict, there was little chance
that it would serve as an effective deterrent, a guide for military engagement,
or a guide to post-conflict criminal liability and prosecution because of the
massive governmental collapse going on at the time within the country itself.
C.

The 1972 UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World
Cultural and Natural Heritage, also known as the World
Heritage Convention

Among the most prominent international responses to such World War
II failures to prevent cultural destruction was the establishment of the United
Nations Economic, Scientific and Cultural Organization (“UNESCO”) in
1945.74 The UNESCO Constitution reflects an understanding of cultural
property that is held by humanity in common, and UNESCO was founded “to
contribute to peace and security by promoting collaboration among the
nations through education, science and culture in order to further universal
respect for justice, for the rule of law and for . . . human rights and
fundamental freedoms . . . .”75 It considers the preservation of cultural
property “a sacred duty which all the nations must fulfil in a spirit of mutual
assistance and concern,”76 and it recognizes that there is a sense of a common
human culture to be preserved despite the existence of national boundaries
and inter- and intranational disputes.
Under the 1972 World Heritage Convention, sites of “cultural heritage”
are defined as monuments, buildings, or other sites “of outstanding universal
value from the point of view of history, art or science . . . [or] from the
historical, aesthetic, ethnological or anthropological point of view.”77 The
shift in phraseology from the 1954 Hague Convention on display here is
particularly remarkable, as the international community faces a moment in
73

Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 349.
Id. at 341; see also The Organization’s History, UNESCO, http://www.unesco.org/new/en/unesco/
about-us/who-we-are/history/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
75
UNESCO Constitution, supra note 3, art. 1.
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Id. pmbl.
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Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage art. 1, Nov. 16, 1972,
1037 U.N.T.S. 151 [hereinafter World Heritage Convention], https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/
Volume%201037/volume-1037-I-15511-English.pdf; see also What Is Meant by “Cultural Heritage”?,
supra note 48.
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which it must restructure key cultural heritage protections. From “property of
great importance to the cultural heritage of every people,”78 UNESCO
narrows its site designation to include only those “of outstanding universal
value.”79 The emphasis on an objective and universal historical and cultural
narrative is of particular interest here, as ideological intranational conflicts
often center on the ownership of and ability to control this type of narrative.
While it may seem obvious, it is important to specify that UNESCO is
premised on the notion that such a narrative is valuable to the international
community as a whole.
UNESCO and its officials emphasize this perspective in their public
statements. For example, Irina Bukova, the Director-General of UNESCO
since 2009, has called the recent surge in attacks on cultural property “part . . .
of the same global strategy of persecution and destruction, which seeks to tear
at the fabric of society, to deny human rights and to quash the rule of law. . . .
[W]e must win the battle of ideas . . . in order to prevent further radicalization”
and to combat a “global strategy of hatred.”80 Bukova characterizes the World
Heritage Convention as “consider[ing] attacks on cultural heritage as attacks
on our shared identity.”81 It is because of this foundational premise that
UNESCO is entitled to challenge the actions of groups functioning within
sovereign nations like Mali.
Mali is a member state of UNESCO, 82 and the city of Timbuktu was
designated a UNESCO World Heritage site in 1988.83 Situated south of the
Sahara desert on the banks of the Niger River, the city was founded, likely as
a Tuareg nomad camp, around 1100 CE and grew into an Islamic trade center
for salt and gold in the fourteenth century. 84 Between the fifteenth and
sixteenth centuries, it was a center of Islamic spiritual and intellectual life in
Africa, and it was home to the University of Sankore and 180 Quranic
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mali.html (last updated Jan. 28, 2010, 11:54 AM).
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visited Nov. 4, 2017).
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schools.85 It is also home to three historic mosques: the Djingareyber Mosque,
rebuilt and enlarged in 1570–1583; the Sankore Mosque, restored in
approximately 1578–1582; and the Sidi Yahia Mosque, restored in
approximately 1577–1578, as well as “sixteen mausoleums and holy public
places.”86 Under the Operational Guidelines for the Implementation of the
World Heritage Convention, Timbuktu was selected for designation based on
three discrete criteria:
Criterion (ii): The mosques and holy places of Timbuktu have
played an essential role in the spread of Islam in Africa at an
early period.
Criterion (iv): The three great mosques of Timbuktu, restored by
the Qadi Al Aqib in the 16th century, bear witness to the golden
age of the intellectual and spiritual capital at the end of the Askia
dynasty.
Criterion (v): The three mosques and mausoleums are
outstanding witnesses to the urban establishment of Timbuktu,
its important role of commercial, spiritual and cultural centre on
the southern trans-Saharan trading route, and its traditional
characteristic construction techniques. Their environment has
now become very vulnerable under the impact of irreversible
change.87
As earthen structures, the monuments of Timbuktu are vulnerable to natural
deterioration and require regular maintenance, characteristics which kept it
foremost in the minds of those observing and monitoring the status of World
Heritage sites that may be classified as “in danger” even before armed conflict
broke out.88 Sites like the Timbuktu monuments may be added to the List of
World Heritage in Danger on the basis of either environmental threats—for
example, an impending change in weather patterns that might cause wood to
rot faster—or threats of destruction as a result of nearby armed conflict.89 In
85

Timbuktu, UNESCO WORLD HERITAGE CTR., http://whc.unesco.org/en/list/119 (last visited Nov.
11, 2017).
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Id.
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visited Nov. 4, 2017).

December 2017

“So Far as War Allows”

333

2012, “UNESCO immediately raised the issue of the destruction of the
Mausoleums in Mali to the attention of the [ICC],” 90 even prior to Mali’s selfreferral to the ICC.91
D.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court

Finally, it was under the Rome Statute, which created the ICC, that Al
Mahdi was charged and convicted of the war crime of cultural destruction.
Unlike many other countries rich in immovable cultural heritage and
struggling with intra- and international armed conflict—such as Iraq, Iran,
Syria, and Libya—Mali is a party to the Rome Statute, having ratified it on
August 16, 2000.92 Article 8 proscribes “[i]ntentionally directing attacks
against buildings dedicated to religion, education, art, science or charitable
purposes, [and] historic monuments . . . provided they are not military
objectives.”93 As with other international legal provisions protecting
immovable property, there remains an exception for actions of military
necessity. The Rome Statute is remarkable, however, in its extension of the
law to reach crimes committed during intranational and not merely
international conflicts.94
Like General Eisenhower, the ICC draws a sharp distinction between
war crimes that destroy lives and those that destroy culture, but that very
distinction highlights tensions it is perhaps ill-equipped to address. Despite
the lofty mandates of the Lieber Code, victorious armies have often reserved
the right to dictate the culture and beliefs of those they conquer. It has been
observed that international law protecting cultural property during armed
conflict could be stronger, or at least better and more carefully enforced.
90
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However, the international organizations that devise and enforce it remain lax
“because states are unwilling to trust international organizations to serve their
interests.”95 Furthermore, laws protecting bodies rather than buildings are
simply easier to understand as a reasonable international means of limiting
power; even cooperative states adopt a “very cautious approach to constraints
on their means of waging effective warfare.”96
In Mali, international human rights observers and victims have accused
all of the groups involved in the 2012 conflict of grave war crimes, including
torture and murder.97 However, international actors, including France, the
United States, and the European Union, have condemned only those
committed by non-state actors.98 This situation arguably makes the ICC’s
high-profile prosecution of cultural destruction ring somewhat hollow. 99 Such
optically lopsided condemnations threaten to deepen a fundamental mistrust
of cultural property protections germane to the field for all states, but
especially for groups attempting to enact sweeping cultural changes, as is the
case for many of the extremist groups currently engaging in iconoclasm.
III.

CULTURAL DESTRUCTION IN TIMBUKTU AND THE AL MAHDI TRIAL
A.

Cultural Heritage in Timbuktu

There are 333 Sufi saints buried in Timbuktu, and even during the
unrest of 2012, city residents were accustomed to honoring the generationsold practice of visiting the historic mausoleums of the saints and the gravesites
of relatives on a regular basis to pray and to maintain the grounds.100 A Human
Rights Watch report on the 2012 conflict quoted a Timbuktu resident
explaining, “We pray to [the Sufi saints] for everything we look for in life,”
and another resident saying, “After prayers [every week] we always visit the
graves of our dead. We clean the sand the winds have left. We pray for them.
95

Posner, supra note 26, at 219.
Abtahi, supra note 36, at 5 (noting that “Geneva law, which protects war victims,” is much more
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For us it is a sign of respect and a reminder not to forget them or where we’ve
come from.”101 A BBC News article quoted yet another resident emphasizing
that local pride in the shrines stemmed from their being emblematic of
Timbuktu’s Islamic heritage: “We are proud that Timbuktu was founded by
Muslims. It has never been a pagan city and our monuments are Muslim
ones.”102
Because these sites were integral to civilians’ daily lives and were also
of considerable historical value, their destruction during the 2012 Malian
conflict exemplifies one of the most serious challenges to the international
protection of cultural property. The World Heritage sites in Timbuktu were
historically significant and recognized as such by the international
community, but they also played a major role in residents’ traditional religious
and cultural practices. It is often tempting to separate rationales for the
protection of property during armed conflict into the protection of property
used by civilians and the protection of property of a more historical or cultural
nature,103 but in communities like Timbuktu, that separation is impossible.
The combined civilian and cultural value of the heritage sites in Timbuktu
made for a particularly complicated collision between culturally hegemonic
Salafi groups—attempting to bring about a rapid and radical cultural shift—
and the Sufi majority populace as well as the preservation-minded
international community.
B.

Ansar Dine and the 2012–2013 Conflict in Mali

In March of 2012, Malian military officers deposed President Amadou
Toumani Toure, alleging he had failed to respond adequately to Tuareg104 rebel
101
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groups attacking northern Malian towns. 105 Those who led the coup
subsequently also failed to defeat these groups.106 In April, the Tuareg
organization National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad (“MNLA”)
and the Islamist group Ansar Dine merged and took control of Timbuktu, 107
and in May, joined by Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (“AQIM”),108 they
declared northern Mali an Islamic state.109 It was at this time that Ansar Dine
imposed their interpretation of Islamic law in Timbuktu. 110
The full Arabic name of Ansar Dine is Harakat Ansar al-Dine, which
means, “movement of defenders of the faith.”111 It is a Malian group led by
Iyad Ag Ghaly, a Tuareg rebel, and its goal is to bring Mali under Islamic
law.112 Like other Islamist groups in the area, they ascribe to the Salafi sect
of Islam, whereas most Malians belong to the Sufi sect.113 The Salafi sect
regards shrines like those in Timbuktu as idolatrous.114 The destruction of
Sufi shrines has been a consistent feature of the actions of groups that rose to
prominence during and in the wake of the “Arab Spring.”115 However, the
conflict between these sects dates back centuries.116
Ahmad Al Faqi Al Mahdi is a Tuareg scholar of Islam who was known
for his introverted personality, his fluency in Arabic, 117 his flawless
memorization of the Quran,118 and his passion for a strict interpretation of
105
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Islamic law.119 Born in Agoune,120 a village located about 60 miles west of
Timbuktu and from which jihadists are known to be recruited,121 he had also
lived in Libya and Saudi Arabia, attended a Quranic college, and worked as a
teacher in Mali prior to the conflict in 2012.122
It is unclear why exactly Al Mahdi was attracted to Ansar Dine, but
observers of the rise of jihadist groups in this region have pointed to
commonplace, violent attacks by bandits stealing livestock from herdsmen
living in villages like Agoune as a reason why the jihadists hold such sway in
the area.123 In recent years, for example, the Malian government is thought to
have failed to address the problem of lawlessness in the rural parts of northern
Mali.124 Jihadist groups, according to some residents, “provide a better
alternative to the state,” and although the groups’ responses have been brutal
and violative of human rights, at least these responses arguably reduce the
banditry that threatens herdsmen’s livelihoods.125
When Ansar Dine and AQIM swept into Timbuktu in April of 2012, Al
Mahdi assisted their administration as “an expert on matters of religion.”126
In order to enforce their interpretation of Islamic law on the residents of
Timbuktu, Ansar Dine and AQIM established “a local government, which
included an Islamic tribunal, an Islamic police force, a media commission and
a morality brigade . . . called the Hesbah.”127 Al Mahdi served as the leader
of the Hesbah from April to September 2012.128 The Hesbah was charged
with “repressing anything perceived by the occupiers to constitute a visible
vice.”129 Some witnesses described Al Mahdi’s demeanor as that of a “town
sheriff” who “present[ed] himself as the boss of all the city’s imams.”130 In
addition to his crimes of cultural destruction, it appears likely from residents’
119
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statements131 that Al Mahdi led the Hesbah in punishing the citizens of
Timbuktu for moral offenses132 such as smoking and drinking alcohol. 133 In
particular, human rights activists claim the Hesbah was complicit in Ansar
Dine’s abuse of the women and girls of Timbuktu. 134
C.

Al Mahdi and the Destruction of Timbuktu

As leader of the Hesbah, Al Mahdi had been tasked with monitoring
traditional prayer practices at the mausoleums that were in conflict with the
beliefs of Ansar Dine and the type of law they sought to impose in
Timbuktu.135 He met with local religious leaders and “explain[ed] on the radio
what could and could not be done at the mausoleums.”136 However, in June
and July of 2012,137 Iyad Ag Ghaly, the leader of Ansar Dine, decided that the
mausoleums and mosques in Timbuktu that Ansar Dine considered contrary
to their religious beliefs must be destroyed.138 There was no question as to Al
Mahdi’s role in orchestrating the destruction of the Timbuktu mausoleums and
mosques, but he also “recommended [to Ansar Dine leadership] not
destroying the mausoleums so as to maintain relations between the population
and the occupying groups.”139 However, it ultimately fell to Al Mahdi to carry
out the instruction to destroy the sites.140
On July 2, 2012,141 in front of the cameras of journalists,142 the Hesbah
proceeded to systematically destroy nine mausoleums and the door of the Sidi
Yahia Mosque.143 In video footage, members of Ansar Dine can be seen
sitting atop the mausoleums, chipping away the fragile earthen structures with
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poles and pickaxes, and using crowbars to pry apart the walls of the
structures.144 They planned to destroy every Sufi shrine in Timbuktu. 145
As many observers have noted, 146 the scene was eerily familiar: it
recalled that of the destruction of the Bamiyan Buddhas 147 by the Taliban in
Afghanistan in 2001.148 As at Bamiyan, the iconoclasm in Timbuktu was
preceded and followed by urgent calls from UNESCO to stop the
destruction.149 There, too, leaders ensured that the destruction was recorded
by journalists who would spread the news of the Taliban’s defiance to the rest
of the international community.150
Ansar Dine seemed to emulate this style of defiant publicity in its own
efforts. As the mausoleums fell, Al Mahdi explained to a journalist, “The
Prophet [Mohamed] said break apart these mausoleums because all people are
equal and so in a cemetery no tomb must rise higher than another,” describing
his role in the destruction as “justify[ing] all decisions made in the name of
sharia, the name of the Quran.”151 During the destruction of the ancient door
of the Sidi Yahia Mosque, Al Mahdi told journalists, “We fear that these
myths [about the door] will invade the beliefs of people and the ignorant who,
because of their ignorance and their distance from religion, will think that
[these myths are] the truth.”152
These justifications were not directly related to the conflict in which
Ansar Dine was involved. The invasion Al Mahdi was trying to prevent was
an invasion of the minds of the residents of Timbuktu, not a physical invasion
of the mosque or of the city. Ansar Dine’s goal was not merely to take control
of the city and the region while Mali’s official government crumbled, but to
take control of the minds of its inhabitants. When they smashed the
mausoleums to rubble, they did so intending to smash the beliefs of the
citizens of Timbuktu. In the words of one journalist, “In destroying these
144
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sacred places, the jihadists were launching an assault on the Sufi-influenced
form of Islam practised in Timbuktu.”153 Reflecting later on the events of
2012, the Malian Minister of Culture “described the destruction of the
Timbuktu monuments as ‘an attack on what fuels our soul, on the very essence
of our cultural values. Their objective was to destroy our past, our culture,
our identity, and in fact our dignity.’”154
After Mali’s self-referral to the ICC, on July 1, 2012, ICC Chief
Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda “declared that the destruction of Sufi shrines in
Timbuktu may constitute a war crime under the Rome Statute” and launched
an official investigation.155 In January of 2013, the Malian government
requested help from France to subdue the groups in the north, which were
moving south.156 The French army recaptured Timbuktu by the end of the
month,157 and in August of 2013, United Nations (“U.N.”) forces began to
stabilize the north.158
As a result of the 2012 conflict, 58,594 people remain internally
displaced.159 These displaced persons include members of the judiciary and
police, who have been slow to return to northern Mali. 160 This delay has
hindered the return of the rule of law and has possibly contributed to the
ongoing prominence of jihadist groups in the area.161 According to postconflict reports from 2016, Malian villagers’ accounts of their interactions
with jihadists differed as to whether they helped or hindered the armed theft
of herdsmen’s cows and sheep, and as to whether they are sources of chaos or
order.162 In contrast to its stern rebuke of the actions of Islamist militants in
the country, the Malian authorities continue to be accused of “turn[ing] a blind
eye” to violations of human rights allegedly perpetrated by the Malian armed
forces.163 Many in Mali continue to crave justice.164
153
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On September 18, 2015, a warrant was issued for Al Mahdi’s arrest,165
and on September 26, 2015, Al Mahdi was apprehended by French troops in
an arms-smuggling convoy in Niger 166 and brought to The Hague to stand
trial.167 Al Mahdi was charged with violating Article 8(2)(e)(iv) of the Rome
Statute,168 which describes cultural destruction of this type as a war crime
under the subheading of “[o]ther serious violations of the laws and customs
applicable in armed conflicts not of an international character, within the
established framework of international law.”169 Armed conflicts “not of an
international character” are defined as those “that take place in the territory of
a State when there is protracted armed conflict between governmental
authorities and organized armed groups or between such groups.”170 In this
context, Al Mahdi was specifically accused of violating Article 8(2)(e)(iv) by
“[i]ntentionally directing attacks against buildings dedicated to religion . . .
[and] historic monuments, . . . provided they are not military objectives.”171
It is important to remember that certain aspects of Al Mahdi’s trial and
conviction indicate the ICC may have pursued this particular charge against
him in order to reach other members of Ansar Dine guilty of war crimes
against persons.172 As previously noted, 173 although he was charged with a
crime against property, there is some evidence of Al Mahdi’s involvement in
other crimes against the citizens of Timbuktu during his time as the leader of
the Hesbah.174 The charge he faced under Article 8(2)(e)(iv) carried a possible
term of up to thirty years’ imprisonment.175 However, the prosecution
recommended only nine to eleven years based on their agreement with Al
Mahdi’s defense team.176 This plea agreement, which Al Mahdi and the
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prosecution signed on February 18, 2016, prior to his trial, refers to Al
Mahdi’s “cooperation with the Court” as a “mitigating circumstance[]” that
the ICC may weigh in determining his sentence.177 The ICC was not bound
by this agreement,178 but Al Mahdi’s ultimate sentence of nine years fell
within its parameters. It has been speculated that his prosecution for cultural
destruction alone at this time is related to his possible cooperation in the
apprehension and prosecution of others with whom he was associated in
Timbuktu.179 This type of deal may become an important tool in an
international strategy to prosecute non-state actors guilty of war crimes.
Nevertheless, the trial itself put the crime of cultural destruction front
and center. In her opening statement at Al Mahdi’s trial, ICC Chief Prosecutor
Fatou Bensouda emphasized the historic nature of the trial as well as the
regrettably familiar facts of the case.180 Though also making note of Al
Mahdi’s cooperation with the prosecution, she observed:
Today’s trial is . . . all the more historic in view of the destructive
rage that marks our times, in which humanity’s common heritage
is subject to repeated and planned ravages by individuals and
groups whose goal is to eradicate any representation of a world
that differs from theirs by eliminating the physical
manifestations that are at the heart of communities.181
When Al Mahdi entered his guilty plea, he apologized and did not contest any
aspect of the charges against him.
Dismissing his well-publicized
justifications of his actions during the attack on the mausoleums, he conceded
that he had acted in an objectively “evil” way, remarking, “We need to speak
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justice even to ourselves. We have to be truthful, even if it burns our own
hands.”182
IV.

CONCLUSION

Al Mahdi’s trial was the first application of Article 8(2)(e)(iv), 183 a fact
indicative of the difficulties the international community has encountered in
its attempts to curtail cultural destruction, even in the face of a global
epidemic.184 The current legal regime is ill-suited for conflicts with and
among non-state actors because existing international law protecting cultural
property in conflict zones was designed for a type of war which bears little
resemblance to the major conflicts of recent years. Non-state actors often
attempt to establish themselves as permanent leaders in the places they invade
during armed conflict and to bring about a change in the relationship between
religion, the law, and the way residents live their lives. These goals
complicate the World War II-era notions of cultural preservation. For the
jihadists swept up in groups like Ansar Dine, the motivation to destroy World
Heritage sites like those at Timbuktu may be more similar to that of civilians
“in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union [as] they tore down the statues of . . .
Lenin and Stalin.”185 Those who fight in modern contexts in which cultural
property is at stake are unlikely to be deterred by a war crime statute wielded
only against those who are unsuccessful in accomplishing widespread cultural
revolution.
The international community must strike a delicate balance between
apathy and intrusive interventionism in order to effectively deter cultural
destruction during times of civil unrest. The Al Mahdi conviction stands as a
stark reminder of the reasons why these crimes so frequently go unaddressed.
As of late 2017, of the fifty-four sites currently included on the List of World
Heritage in Danger, twenty-five are cultural heritage sites located in North
Africa and the Middle East.186
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However, the sequence of events in Mali exemplifies a certain kind of
progress. At the end of the day, a prominent perpetrator of culturally
destructive war crimes against immovable cultural property was tried and
convicted in the ICC in a display of the authority of cultural heritage laws on
the world stage. As the first guilty plea before the ICC,187 it will potentially
be remembered as an important exemplar of the prosecution effectively using
the cultural destruction charge to work with a defendant to gather evidence
about war crimes committed by others at the same time. 188 Al Mahdi’s
cooperation will be crucial as the ICC continues its investigation of the 2012
conflict and as Mali continues to pick up the pieces of a broken national
identity.189 Although the Malian government forces that subdued the Islamist
groups in the north engaged in their own torture and other human rights
abuses, the government has failed to investigate or prosecute those war
crimes,190 so the burden of enforcement may rest with an international
community now familiar with the situation.
Additionally, in August of 2017, the ICC issued a Reparations Order
against Al Mahdi, ordering him to pay 2.7 million euros for his culturally
destructive crimes in Timbuktu. 191 Though Al Mahdi is indigent, a separate
agency called the Trust Fund for Victims192 will match the award and prepare
an implementation plan, a draft of which will be submitted to the court in
2018.193 The order comes amid doubts that it can be effectively distributed,
given the ongoing instability of northern Mali, and fears that such awards may
incentivize future destruction.194
In terms of furthering the deterrence of culturally destructive war
crimes, the events in the aftermath of Al Mahdi’s arrest and subsequent trial
are perhaps the most hopeful signs. On April 25, 2013, the U.N. Security
Council established the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated
Stabilization Mission in Mali (“MINUSMA”),195 a U.N. peacekeeping force
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that, in 2015,196 was additionally “mandated to support the Malian authorities
in protecting Mali’s cultural and historic sites from attacks.”197 Security
Council Resolution 2227 specifically directs MINUSMA to “assist Malian
authorities . . . in protecting from attack the cultural and historical sites in
Mali.”198 Its efforts include a Quick Impact Project to rebuild Timbuktu’s
manuscript libraries also destroyed during the 2012 conflict.199
Although cultural artifacts once destroyed are gone forever, modern
documentation and research efforts can lead restorative efforts to help
communities heal. In September of 2016, just days before Al Mahdi was
convicted, citizens of Timbuktu gathered to unveil a restored version of the
sacred gate of the Sidi Yahia mosque destroyed by the Hesbah in 2012. 200 This
was the culmination of a UNESCO rehabilitation effort commenced in 2013
shortly after French forces retook the city.201 It involved the efforts of local
carpenters and stonemasons using traditional methods to rebuild each
mausoleum destroyed by Ansar Dine. 202 At a 2016 consecration ceremony for
the rebuilt mausoleums, Almamy Koureissi, a spokesperson for the Minister
of Culture, Handicrafts and Tourism of Mali, observed, “Culture is at the heart
of government action because we have found our bearings, our cultural values.
We need to embrace our moral center, to remain standing, open to the world,
welcoming and hospitable in accordance with our legendary traditions.”203
Furthermore, in November of 2016, UNESCO hosted a workshop at the
National Museum of Mali in Bamako to train thirty representatives of Malian
armed forces in the preservation of cultural heritage during armed conflict. 204
The workshop represented an important step for the U.N. in providing
resources for member states to “familiarize them with the tools at their
196
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disposal for ensuring protection of citizens and cultural property.”205 Similar
man-made disasters have in the past led to greater visibility and protection of
cultural property,206 and there is reason to believe that the destruction in
Timbuktu and the Al Mahdi conviction will do the same in Mali.207 That
visibility may continue to be vital in the near future—there are reports that a
new Islamist group, also related to AQIM, called the Macina Liberation Front,
has begun attacking Malian politicians and military.208 The Malian Army
continues to be accused of human rights abuses as it fights back. 209
The rise of iconoclasm and resulting World Heritage losses, from
Bamiyan to Timbuktu, have also mobilized international efforts to contribute
to better documentation of attacks on threatened sites. For example,
Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa (“EAMENA”)
uses satellite imagery to compile a spatial database that can provide risk
assessment information to heritage professionals. 210 In the words of
EAMENA, “Not all damage and threats to the archaeology can be prevented,
but they can be mitigated”211 by its efforts “to create an accessible body of
data . . . to target those sites most in danger and better plan and implement the
preservation and protection of this heritage.”212
These forms of international outreach and cooperation hold some
promise to clarify the rationale and scope of international laws protecting
cultural heritage even in regions undergoing major sociopolitical upheaval.
While Al Mahdi’s conviction is a step in the right direction, the specific
factors in place that made his prosecution possible—especially Mali’s
ratification of certain key international conventions and the Rome Statute—
are unique and unlikely to lead to relief for other civilian communities
suffering similar atrocities. Although the fundamental logic of cultural
heritage has been something of an unwritten norm for centuries, in practice, it
has been frequently violated in favor of military expediency, and “impunity,
205

Id.
Gerstenblith, supra note 9, at 355–56. In particular, Gerstenblith points to the looting that
accompanied the United States’ 2003 invasion of Iraq followed by the enactment and ratification of tighter
protections for Iraqi cultural property. Id.
207
See id. at 387–88.
208
Dufka, supra note 118.
209
Dufka, supra note 118.
210
Endangered Archaeology in the Middle East and North Africa, EAMENA,
http://eamena.arch.ox.ac.uk/ (last visited Nov. 11, 2017).
211
Id.
212
Background and Aims, EAMENA, http://eamena.arch.ox.ac.uk/background-and-aims/ (last visited
Nov. 11, 2017).
206

December 2017

“So Far as War Allows”

347

rather than accountability, has been the norm.”213 The cosmopolitan
philosophy of collective ownership of cultural treasures can be cast as a
conqueror’s philosophy; a philosophy which holds those cultural treasures at
arm’s length, and is likely to seem irrelevant and self-interested to those
instigating radical ideological change in the states that hold them. The
fundamental assumptions at the heart of the international protection of cultural
heritage must evolve alongside the evolution of the rules of armed conflict in
order to better reflect the realities of modern threats. In the words of ICC
Chief Prosecutor Fatou Bensouda, when it comes to the destruction of cultural
heritage, “[h]istory will not be generous to our failure to care.”214
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